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Posts Tagged ‘first-to-invent’


Lawsuit Challenges AIA’s Constitutionality

According to the New York Times Article Inventor Challenges a Sweeping Revision in Patent Law, a lawsuit has been filed to challenge the Constitutionality of the “first to file” provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA).  The lawsuit was filed by Mr. Stadnyk who holds several patents related to motorcycles.  He compares his fight against the AIA to the battle against Obama Care, which I believe is very appropriate.  Both were large complicated pieces of legislation laden with special interest goddies.  Both ignored the clear meaning of the Constitution.  Given this it is surprising that Mr. Stadnyk selected an attorney who is not committed to the Constitution.  Mr. Stadnyk attorney is Jonathan S. Massey, who is a protégé of Laurence H. Tribe.  Mr. Tribe has been a leading advocate of the ‘living Constitution’ concept and believes the Commerce Clause is an open ended excuse for the expansion of government power.  Hopefully Mr. Massey will be able to argue effectively despite these leanings.  I also hope that they hire a patent attorney.  As the Supreme Court has proven over a century of confused decisions, most attorneys do not understand patent law and cannot pick it up by just reading the confused decisions of the Supremes.

I and others have argued that the First-to-File (FTF) provision of the America Invents Act (AIA) is unconstitutional.  For instance see First to File is it Constitutional, which is a open letter by a number of law professors.  The essence of the argument is that Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, grants Congress the power to protect inventors’ rights in their creations, not the first person to file at the Patent Office.  I suspect the opponents will argue the following points:

*Standing:  Mr. Stadnyk holds a number of patents, but these are not going to be effected by the AIA.  Mr. Stadnyk may have filed a number of patent applications, but these are not going to be effected.  If I were the opponents, I would argue that only a patent application that was denied under the first-to-file rule, but would have been issued under a first-to-invent (FTI) system would be well enough developed issue to provide standing.  If they succeed with this argument it could be years before a plaintiff had standing to sue.

I think the counter argument is that any inventor whose actions have been effected (changed) because of the change in the rule should have standing.  I think this may be the most difficult argument for Mr. Stadnyk to win because it will allow the courts to avoid the difficult questions presented by this suit.

*First Inventor-to-File:  The proponents of the FTF system have argued that the AIA is really a first inventor to file.  What does that mean?  How can you be the first inventor to file?  What does the word inventor mean?  INVENTOR means the first person to create an invention.  There is no such thing as the first inventor to file.  There can only be one (one group of) inventor.  All others are just re-creators.  For example, if I, with no knowledge of Calculus, were to recreate it today that does not make me the discover of Calculus and the equivalent of Newton or Leibnitz.  Even if my discovery is close in time to the inventor’s, I am still just a re-creator.  This is no different than science or the winner of a race, or the winner of a football game.  There is only one winner and there is only one inventor.

Now advocates of the AIA will argue that the first person to create an invention is not always considered the inventor under the present system.  Under the rules of interferences the second person to create the invention can be considered the inventor, if they did it without any knowledge of the first creator’s work and if the first creator abandoned their efforts to perfect the invention or concealed the invention.  If someone abandons an invention, then it was not created or at the least it provided no benefit to world or even the inventor.  You cannot award a patent or inventorship to someone who does not tell you about their invention.  In the case of abandonment, I do not see how that person can be considered an inventor.  The other case is concealment.  In that case, the proponents of the FTF system should argue that no patent should issue not that we should change our whole system to accommodate this very rare circumstance.

 

*Alice in Wonderland Argument:  Proponents of the FTF system will argue that the word INVENTOR can mean anything that Congress decides it means.  If that were true, why write a Constitution.  IF Congress can define every word as it wishes, then it is pointless to write down a founding document.  This is a nonsensical argument, but one the statists on the Supreme Court are likely to find appealing.

*Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:  Proponents of the AIA are likely to argue that the Constitutional purpose of a patent system is to ‘promote the progress of science and the useful arts’ and Congress can do anything to further that purpose.  First of all this theory confuses the purpose of the preamble with the actual right involved.  The purpose of a preamble is explanatory, but not mandatory.   This is exactly the way preambles work in patent law.  Second, the Constitution says the EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS of inventors.  It is the only RIGHT mentioned in the original Constitution and when the founders used the word right they meant natural rights.  The purpose of government is to secure these rights – see the Declaration of Independence.  The purpose of government is not to promote the progress of science and the useful arts that is the result of securing the exclusive rights of inventors (and authors).

The proponents of the AIA will not admit it, but all empirical evidence shows that a FTI system is more effective at promoting science and the useful arts than a FTF system.  This is not surprising since a FTI system rewards the creator not just the person who can game the system the best.

*Treaty Obligation:  The advocates of the AIA will argue that our treaty obligations require the US to award patents to foreigners under the FTF system.  This is true.  However, treaty obligations do not trump the Constitution.  We should renegotiate these treaties not trash the Constitution.

Conclusion

It would be nice to believe that patent law is not influenced by politics, but a century of activist Supreme Court Judges shows this is not the case.  The most egregious example was the 1949 case Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572  (1949) where Justice Jackson ignored the Constitution and stated that “The only valid patent is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”  None of the present Supreme Court Justices understands patent law as well as a first year patent law associate and so this case will probably turn more on politics than the law or logic.

 

The following letter from a number of Law Professors deals with the Constitutionality of a First-to-File system as contemplated by the America Invents Act (H.R. 1249 and S. 23) 

 
First-to-File: Is it Constitutional?

The following letter from a number of Law Professors deals with the Constitutionality of a First-to-File system as contemplated by the America Invents Act (H.R. 1249 and S. 23)

June 17, 2011

By Email

Speaker John Boehner

Office of the Speaker

H-232 U.S. Capitol

Washington, DC 20515

Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi

Office of the Democratic Leader

H-204 U.S. Capitol

Washington, DC 20515

Re: Unconstitutionality of “First-Inventor-to-File” Provision in H.R. 1249

Dear Speaker Boehner and Leader Pelosi:

We are writing concerning the issue of the unconstitutionality of § 2 in H.R. 1249, the provision titled “first-inventor-to-file.” It is the belief of the signatories to this letter, all of whom are law professors who specialize in intellectual property law, that this provision is unconstitutional under the Copyright and Patent Clause in Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8.

Section 2 of H.R. 1249 violates both the plain terms of the Copyright and Patent Clause and the historical interpretation of this clause by Congresses and the federal courts. Although there are many legitimate concerns about H.R. 1249’s impact on innovation, this unconstitutional provision by itself is sufficient to justify withdrawing this bill from consideration. At a minimum, this is a justifiable reason supporting the 54 House Members who have joined the June 1, 2011 letter to the Rules Committee in expressing their concerns about the constitutionality of H.R. 1249.

H.R. 1249 Unquestionably Takes Patents Away From Inventors

Although the word “inventor” appears in the title in § 2, which confusingly uses the phrase “first-inventor-to-file,” it nonetheless creates the same first-to-file rights that existed in the patent reform bills that had been introduced in prior Congresses and which were universally recognized as creating a first-to-file patent system. It also creates the exact same first-to-file rights that exist in other countries that have adopted first-to-file patent systems in both name and substance, such as Canada. Section 2 has to create a first-to-file patent system if only because one of the primary justifications for this provision in H.R. 1249 is that the United States should harmonize with other countries’ first-to-file patent systems. In sum, despite the confusion created by its title, H.R. 1249 unquestionably creates a first-to-file patent system.

The Constitution Only Empowers Congress to Give Patents to “Inventors”

The basis of the 220-year-old first-to-invent patent system in the United States is the Copyright and Patent Clause, which states that Congress has the power:

“To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8 (emphasis added).

The operative terms for patent law is that Congress is empowered only to “secure[e]” to “Inventors” their “exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”

In the Founding Era, the term “Inventors” was defined in the newly independent United States of America as referring only to first inventors. In Samuel Johnson’s 1785 dictionary, often relied on by the Supreme Court as an authoritative source of meaning in the Founding Era, an “inventor” is defined as “one who produces something new; a devisor of something not known before.” Moreover, Johnson defined a “discoverer” as “one that finds anything unknown before.” Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1785). Johnson was not alone in thinking that “Inventors” referred only to first inventors. St. George Tucker, for instance, defended the Copyright and Patent Clause against criticisms that it empowered Congress to create commercial monopolies by observing that “nothing could be more fallacious,” because this constitutional provision limited Congress to securing only an “exclusive right” in “authors and inventors.” St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, vol. 1, appendix (1803): p. 266.

Moreover, the First Congress, whose acts are often recognized as probative of the original meaning of constitutional terms, explicitly rejected the English practice of granting patents to importers of technology, recognizing that importers were not first and true inventors. During the drafting of the bill that became the Patent Act of 1790, the House committee decided not to follow the English practice of extending patent rights to the “first importer” of overseas inventions. Representative Thomas Fitzsimmons wrote: “The 6th Section, allowing Importers, was left out, the Constitutional power being Questionable.” See Karen E. Simon, The Patent Reform Act’s Proposed First-to-File Standard: Needed Reform or Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. l. 129, 141 & n. 95 (2006-2007) (quoting congressional record).

Thus the Patent Act of 1790 authorized the grant of a patent only to a person who has “invented or discovered any useful art . . . not before known or used.” See Patent Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. at 109-110. The Patent Act of 1790 further provided for termination of a patent “if it shall appear that the patentee was not the first and true inventor.” See Patent Act of 1790, § 6, 1 Stat. at 111. This uniquely American first-to-invent requirement was readopted in all patent statutes enacted by successive Congresses in 1793, 1836, 1870 and 1952.

As the famed patent law historian, Edward Walterscheid, whose work has been relied on by the Supreme Court in many patent cases, has written: “Implicit in the use of the terms ‘inventors’ and ‘discoveries’ in the intellectual property clause is the premise that before an exclusive right can be granted, the discovery to be patented must be novel. . . . Simply put, novelty is a constitutional requirement.” Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., 2002) at p. 310-11 (emphasis added). Walterscheid further writes that James Madison and early Congresses embraced a uniquely “narrow” conception of novelty compared to England (which permitted patents for importation), as they believed that for an invention “to be patentable in the United States a discovery had to be original to the inventor.” Id. at p. 312-13.

Supreme Court Confirms Patents Must Be Granted to Inventors

In numerous court decisions since the early American Republic, Supreme Court Justices have repeatedly recognized that the patent statutes imposed this constitutional requirement. In 1813, Chief Justice John Marshall, riding circuit, wrote that the “constitution and law, taken together, [give] to the inventor, from the moment of invention, an inchoate property therein, which is completed by suing out a patent.” Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564) (emphasis added).

In the Supreme Court’s decision in Stanford v. Roche just last week, Chief Justice Roberts quotes from many of the Supreme Court’s decisions over the past 220 years to establish that “Our precedents confirm the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.” This included, for instance, the decision in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., in which the Supreme Court held that U.S. patents have long secured “the result of an inventive act, the birth of an idea and its reduction to practice; the product of original thought.” 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933) (emphasis added). Justice Joseph Story, recognized by patent scholars today as one of the founders of American patent law, wrote that “No person is entitled to a patent under the act of congress unless he has invented some new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used before.” Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217) (emphasis added).

Congress May Not Define “Inventors” However It Wishes

Some supporters of the constitutionality of § 2 have stated that the meaning of the word “Inventors” in Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8 should be left to the policy discretion of Congress to interpret and apply in its patent statutes. But this cannot be a valid principle for applying constitutional provisions to Congress, because it would mean that every word in every provision of the Constitution should be left to the policy discretion of Congress as to how it should be applied to American citizens. Under this approach, Congress could freely redefine the meaning of “speech” in the First Amendment, or Congress could freely redefine the meaning of “due process” in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Certainly Congress has some discretion within the scope of its enumerated powers to enact legislation; this is why the Framers adopted the Necessary and Proper Clause. But the very idea of a Constitution that specifically enumerates limited powers in the federal government through expressly worded provisions requires that the limiting terms in these provisions not be read out of the Constitution by interpretative fiat. If “Inventors” is to have any meaning whatsoever in defining and limiting the scope of Congress’s power to enact patent statutes under the Copyright and Patent Clause, it can only mean what it has been consistently interpreted to mean for 220 years: patents may be secured only to the first inventors.

Supporters of the constitutionality of § 2 have further claimed that the instances in which patents are denied to first inventors given their post-invention activities, such as public use or abandonment, suppression and concealment of an invention, prove that the Constitution does not require that patents go to first inventors. Again, this is a nonsensical principle of constitutional interpretation. The Constitution establishes the presumption that first inventors are secured a patent, but it does not mandate that first inventors must receive patents regardless of their own actions. Thus, Congresses and courts have identified instances in which post-inventive actions by a first inventor can result in a default on the right to receive a patent. There are myriad examples—such as strategic behavior by an inventor in commercially exploiting an invention as a trade secret long before filing for a patent or an inventor’s publicly disclosing an invention and thus creating reasonable reliance interests in third parties that the invention is in the public domain—but they all entail post-invention actions that result in a substantive or procedural default by the first inventor in receiving a patent. This is no different from the constitutional practice of denying to felons the right to vote or the right to own firearms or restricting every American citizen’s due process rights through statutes of limitation, and so on.

Accommodating Foreign Laws Is No Excuse to Violate Constitution

Lastly, the supporters of the constitutionality of § 2 have alleged that Congress’s longstanding practice of accommodating foreign countries’ first-to-file rules when foreign inventors apply for patents in the U.S. somehow disproves the constitutional argument against this first-to-file provision. But such laws prove no such thing. The Constitution applies only within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States of America, and thus it is merely an act of comity for Congress to permit foreign inventors who have created inventions in foreign countries to apply for U.S. patents; under the Constitution, Congress may permit or refuse such a patent application by discretionary fiat. This is why the United States has entered into treaties to secure international protection of patent rights. It is also why, since the early American Republic, foreign inventors working in foreign countries have always required Congress to enact special statutes to permit them to apply for U.S. patents. But the constitutional requirement for U.S. inventors is neither discretionary nor unclear: It requires that the laws “securing” patents to “Inventors” who are living and working in the United States may do so only for those “Inventors” who have created “Discoveries”—those who are first to invent, not first to file for the patent itself.

In closing, it is our belief that there is a serious question concerning the constitutionality of the first-to-file provision in H.R. 1249. But regardless of whether one agrees that a first-to-file system is unconstitutional, it is entirely appropriate that this debate occur in the deliberations concerning whether H.R. 1249 should be enacted by Congress. The constitutionality of a statute under consideration by Congress, in addition to whatever policy issues may be raised by it, is always something that should be openly and forthrightly considered by Congress, which has as much a duty to uphold the Constitution as do the Executive and Judicial branches.

Sincerely,

Daniel B. Ravicher

Lecturer in Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Executive Director, Public Patent Foundation

Adam Mossoff

Professor of Law

George Mason University School of Law

Lateef Mtima

Professor of Law and Director,

Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice

Howard University School of Law

Kali Murray

Assistant Professor of Law

Marquette University Law School

Sean Patrick Suiter Adjunct Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law Visiting Professor of Law, Peking University School of Law

Dale L. Carson

Adjunct Professor of Law

Quinnipiac University School of Law

 

This is a guest post by David Boundy directed to fellow patent attorneys.

The bill tilts the playing field in favor of multinational corporations and market incumbents.  The bill shifts from today’s emphasis on disclosure and disruptive innovation to favor trade secret and market incumbency, in the following ways.

  • The § 102(a) grace period is totally repealed.  Every inventor will be in a race against all other possible disclosures—no inventor will have the time to perfect and test an invention before filing.  All companies will be forced to file before an invention is fully understood or tested.  That will be expensive for your clients and trouble for you as an attorney, and reduce patent quality.
  • Inventors, entrepreneurs, and startups use the grace period of § 102(a) to meet with investors, do the trial-and-error of R&D, and test their inventions. Under today’s law, the implied obligations of confidentiality in conversations with investors and early-stage partners give sufficient protection to permit these ordinary business activities.  The bill repeals all these protections, and replaces them with a flimsy grace period that creates unacceptable risk of loss of patent rights, that no business can rely on—though adds strong protections for large companies that can raise all their financing, and do all their manufacturing and testing in-house.  Inventors won’t be able to talk to investors without a patent, and won’t be able to file an application without an investor.
  • The bill states that an inventor can recover patent rights if he can prove that all other disclosures originated with the inventor—but the bill neglects to create a procedural forum for showing derivation in cases where the leak is not embodied in a patent application, or where the leak neglects to attribute the original inventor.  As a practical business matter, the bill leaves no commercially-feasible grace period, an integral part of U.S. patent law since 1839.—you will have to file every application as soon as possible, often long before the invention is ready.
  • Today’s law gives Americans several advantages over foreign inventors (under the “Hilmer rule”).  The bill removes these advantages, and instead places American inventors at a disadvantage to foreign inventors.   Consider this fact pattern:
  • A German inventor files a patent application in Europe, and later in the U.S. under a bilateral treaty
  • Shortly after the German’s first filing, an American files a patent application in the U.S. on a similar (not identically the same) invention, and then under the same treaty in Europe

Under the proposed legislation, the German’s patent application will be prior art that blocks the American in the U.S.  If we switch them around, so that the American files first, then the American does not block the German in Europe.  The bill does not “harmonize” the law, and the difference disfavors Americans.

  • The bill provides that all disclosures within and by a single company do not create bars.  This is great for multinational companies, with large in-house staffs, but totally useless for a startup or small company that has to partner with outsiders.  Startups use and need the options and protections of current law, but the new bill cuts them away.
  • A single offer for sale or public demonstration one day before filing a patent application will irretrievably destroy patent rights, if the poorly-drafted language is interpreted literally.
  • The § 102(b) grace period is cut back—it no longer protects against activities by third parties, but only the inventor’s own activities.
  • A new “post grant review” procedure allows a competitor, at a time of his own choosing, to start a half‑million dollar proceeding against a patent holder that has threatened no one.  Existing, more modest versions of this procedure have already put companies out of business.
  • As a patent attorney, you will no longer have time to do a good job preparing a patent application, you’ll be “forced to file” prematurely.  This will expose you to risks and destroy your weekends.  Poor initial applications will drive up post-filing prosecution costs.   The stricter and earlier filing deadlines will place you at a blocking point for many of your clients’ business activities, harming your client relationships.  Where good patent attorneys are allies in creating value for businesses today, the bill will move you to being a cost—at a much lower billing rate.

The bill destroys commercial certainty and corrupts the incentives in the system:

  • Various statutory requirements that an applicant act “without deceptive intention” are repealed—in the future, applicants will have incentive to act with deceptive intent.
  • Key terms of art are redefined—you’ve spent a career learning the meaning of “on sale” and “public use,” but the legislative history fundamentally redefines these terms.  It will take decades for courts to establish new precedent to provide any meaningful commercial certainty.
  • The Metallizing Engineering “secret commercial use” bar is repealed—a company will be able to use an invention as a trade secret, and then spring a patent on the public years later.  That favors market incumbents, but makes innovation harder for everyone else.
  • The “best mode” requirement is reduced to a sham: a patentee will be permitted to disclose only a fictitious embodiment, while holding the best as a trade secret.
  • The bill gives companies the right to patent and repatent inventions for years, to keep them locked up, neither using them nor permitting them to be used, for far longer than 20 years.
  • Several aspects of the “first-inventor-to-file” provision—the ones that give patents to second inventors, and to companies that kept inventions in secret for years before filing patent applications—violate constitutional limits on Congress’ authority—years more litigation and commercial uncertainty.
  • The Act allows Wall Street banks to attack “business method” patents that they are infringing.  This doesn’t extend to any other industry, only business methods—another Wall Street giveaway.

The bill is out of committee—further amendments are unlikely. It is literally impossible to alter the bill to meet the needs of startups through an amendment strategy at this late date.  The multinationals and their congressional allies smell victory.  They see no reason to allow any weakening of their preferred bill through amendments favoring small businesses.   The only option at this point is to vote it down.

Typical inventor activities that no longer “work”

Most startups, and many inventions at established companies, go through at least one of two “stories.”  They’re reasonable commercial practice under today’s law, but not under the bill:

  • An entrepreneur with nothing but an idea typically has to present his idea to dozens of venture capitalists and potential manufacturing or marketing partners, without formal confidentiality agreements, to get a company started. (VC’s never sign confidentiality agreements for first meetings.)  This works under today’s law, because of the implied obligation of confidentiality and the protection of § 102(a), but under the bill, these conversations will create commercially-unacceptable risks to the investor and partner.  U.S. inventors will be under the same “Catch-22” as European inventors—unable to talk to potential investors until a patent application is filed, but unable to file a patent application without an investor.  Startups will die before being born.
  • Companies that need a long “invention incubation” period—trial and error, conceive, test and discard, until finding the “magic combination” of techniques—use the § 102(a) grace period to do their R&D in confidence, and file patent applications only when it’s clear which inventions are valuable, and how they work.  Under the bill, a company will have to file a continuous stream of patent applications, many directed to inventions that are dumped under current law.  This will increase patent costs remarkably.

Almost every startup goes through one of these two, many through both, as new companies create new wealth and new jobs under today’s law.  Inventors wait to file quality patent applications until they have quality inventions.  America’s unique and strong right to file in the future, after the inventor and investor know whether the invention is valuable, makes business easy, and prevents wasted costs for inventions that prove worthless.

The “America Invents Act” revokes this historic right.  Property rights turn on non-business legal technicalities created to satisfy bureaucrats, technicalities that will cost $1 billion annually. The bill requires a company to file premature, hasty, and expensive patent applications on every baby-step idea to preserve rights against third parties who are dabbling in the field without intent to develop a commercial product.  The America Invents Act makes these two stories nonviable for startups—because the authors “didn’t think” about them, or didn’t want to.

In 2010, the Kauffman Foundation and Census Bureau released two studies on job creation.  Both found that “net job growth occurs in the U.S. economy only through start up firms.”  If creating new jobs is Congress’s Job One, then killing the America Invents Act is a good place to start.

The proponents’ arguments do not survive scrutiny

Proponents suggest that the bill does away with complex and costly interferences.  That’s true, but irrelevant.  Under 100 applications per year end up in interferences.  In contrast, the change to today’s “§ 102(a)” grace period affects commercial decisions and raises costs for hundreds of thousands of inventions per year, during the time before filing, by giving inventors and patent attorneys time to get it right the first time.  Because the Patent Office has no insight into the pre-filing process of invention, it simply hasn’t taken into account the realities of invention incubation and the costs of its proposal.  Further, the proposed replacement, “derivation proceedings,” are the most costly disputes in patent law in those jurisdictions where they exist.

Second, proponents argue that provisional applications will be a cheap way to preserve rights.  But that isn’t true under the new law.  Under current law, a cheap provisional is useful to show conception and diligence.  But under Patent Reform, a provisional application only provides legal benefit if prepared with full § 112 ¶ 1 care and completeness.   For a typical startup invention, the cost in attorney fees and inventor time for a provisional application is $10,000 or more—a formidable barrier to an entrepreneur’s first conversation with an investor.

Third, proponents argue, “The bill locks in rights if you publish a disclosure of the invention.”  But all companies rely on secrecy for their future plans.  No company publishes its most sensitive and advanced technology years before introduction.  This argument ignores business reality.

 
Manzullo on American Invents Act

The America Invents Act is bad for the US economy and I will be posting principled statements explaining its flaws.  Rep. Don Manzullo has shown the courage to be an independent thinker and not to blindly follow the lead (money) from large corporations that want a system that makes it easier for them to steal other people’s technology.

U.S. Rep. Don Manzullo (R-IL) released the following statement expressing his concerns with patent reform legislation that was introduced today in the U.S. House of Representatives.

STATEMENT

“I am deeply concerned that ‘The America Invents Act,’ which was introduced today as H.R. 1249, will stall American innovation and send more of our jobs overseas. This legislation reflects an approach to patent reform that stalled previously, in 2007, in the face of massive opposition from American innovators.

“Like its Senate counterpart (S. 23), the House bill includes an unfortunate provision that would shift America’s current patent system – where the first person to conceive of an invention is granted a patent – to a ‘first to file’ system that would turn our system into a foot race to the Patent Office.

“The U.S. has always awarded a patent to the first inventor to come up with an idea, even if somebody else beat them to the Patent Office. The Constitution, in fact, mandates that inventors have exclusive right to their discoveries. This is a system that produced game-changing inventions from people like Samuel Morse, Alexander Graham Bell and Dr. Ray Damadian. Despite that track record, some people are now insisting that the U.S. should ‘harmonize’ with the rest of the world. With all due respect to our friends and allies abroad, I would not trade America’s record of innovation for that of any of those first-to-file countries.

“The bill would also devastate small inventors by effectively eliminating the one-year ‘grace period’ that U.S. inventors currently have. This grace period is critical to small inventors, who can use that year to develop their invention, seek investors and raise funds to begin the expensive patent application process.

“The House bill also fails to provide appropriate safeguards, like those included in S.23, for the controversial new administrative post-grant review process it proposes. Current law already provides two separate administrative tracks to challenge a patent within the PTO, and this bill proposes to add a third ‘post-grant review’ process. Any additional layers of administrative review must be accompanied by safeguards that will diminish the potential for abuse, particularly by infringers with deep pockets and other third parties.

“Moreover, the bill also establishes a transitional review proceeding at the PTO that would affect certain financial service business method patents. Subjecting patent holders who have proven the validity of their patents, both administratively within the PTO and at trial, to a new type of retroactive challenge seems like unnecessary harassment.

“Many of America’s inventors and innovators are alarmed over these fundamental changes to our patent system, and we must hear them out and address their concerns. I urge the House Judiciary Committee to listen to stakeholders of all sizes and perspectives and to find a truly consensus approach to modernizing our patent system.  I look forward to working with my colleagues on and off the Committee to craft legislation that will support and encourage all of our American innovators.”

 
David Boundy’s Excellent Analysis of the First to File Issues

David Boundy, a well known well respected patent attorney, provided the following analysis of the first to file issues in a comment on the blog Patently O.

The problem here is that the Big Company proponents of the bill and the small company folks are talking past each other, and both are right on different pieces.

The section of the bill titled “first to file” has two completely distinct effects — (1) changing the § 102(g) tie-breaker rule, for deciding between two near-simultaneous patent applications directed to the same invention, and (2) weakening the §§ 102(a)-(f) grace period, the deadline for filing a patent application.

The proponents  are correct that first-to-file vs first-to-invent as a tie-breaker between two near-simultaneous patent applications for the same invention yields no significant difference in the outcome, but first-to-file (if the bill changed only the § 102(g) tie-breaker rule) is almost certain to yield significant cost-savings and efficiencies.

The answer is — so what. The § 102(g) tie-breaker rule affects just over one hundred patent applications per year.

The small business folks are concerned about the other part of the same section, the §§ 102(a)-(f) grace period, the deadline for filing a patent application. The grace period is a make-or-break issue for small companies and startups, that need the extra time to seek investors, test their inventions, and the like. The grace period rule is a far larger issue — it affects hundreds of thousands of inventions per year, largely by taking away the time to investigate, think, and make careful efficient economic decisions, and decide not to file patent applications to inventions that turn out to be duds. Those applications are not filed today, but will be filed under Patent Reform, costing small companies about $1 billion per year. And they will bog the PTO under 50,000 to 100,000 more applications, most of which are written in haste, and most of the incremental applications directed to inventions that would have dropped out of the system with more time to think.

The weak grace period of S.23 creates an impossible catch-22 for small companies. Under patent reform, entrepreneurs won’t be able to discuss their ideas with potential investors or other strategic partners until after a patent application is filed because of the risk of losing all patent rights. On the other hand, many entrepreneurs don’t have the money available to file patent applications until after they have funding in hand. This circular dependency will make it impossible to proceed. Current law gives small companies a way out of this deadlock: they take advantage of the grace period to discuss their ideas with investors and partners while they work to get their company running, and file patent applications once investors come on board. But the changes in S.23 create commercially-unacceptable risks for companies that must seek outside investors and partners unless the inventor can find the many thousands of dollars to file a patent application first. That change in the grace period is just fine for multinationals like Kodak, IBM, GE, the big Pharma’s, etc. but for small companies and startups, it’s simply unworkable.

(Note well, all patent attorneys not working in-house—-a weak grace period will send your malpractice premiums through the roof.)

Two economists at McGill University (one of Canada’s two premier universities) studied the economic effects on Canadian inventors and companies when Canada made the same switch in 1989. They found that Canada’s shift to essentially the same weak grace period as in S.23 created no significant benefit, but selectively disadvantaged small companies and domestic-focused companies, and favored large multinational companies. The McGill authors specifically noted that the adverse effects on the U.S. would be larger than they were in Canada, because of the U.S.’s larger fraction of small companies, and larger reliance on our domestic markets.

The data are pretty clear on both sides. The change in § 102(g) tie-breaker rule makes sense, and change to the § 102(a)-(f) grace period rule will be destructive to the U.S. economy. The latter effect is far larger.

Call your representatives, and call your clients and ask them to call your representatives.   All that is required for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing

The two key papers, analyzing empirical data from Canada and Europe, are

Lo & Sutthiphisal, “Does it Matter Who Has the Right to Patent: First-to-Invent or First-to-File? Lessons from Canada,” April 2009, NBER Working Paper No. w14926, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1394833

Boundy & Marquardt, Patent Reform’s Weakened Grace Period: Its Effects On Startups, Small Companies, University Spin-Offs And Medical Innovators, “Medical Innovation & Business Journal, vol. 2 no. 2 (Summer 2010) http://journals.lww.com/medinnovbusiness/Citation/2010/06010/Patent_Reform_s_Weakened_Grace_Period__Its_Effects.6.aspx

 
Senator Feinstein: First-Inventor-to-File a Ruse

According to Broadbandbreakfast.com, Senator Feinstein nailed it!

“I think this is really a battle between the small inventors beginning in the garage, like those who developed the Apple computer that was nowhere, and who, through the first-to-invent system, were able to create one of the greatest companies in the world,” Feinstein said. “America’s great strength is the cutting-edge of innovation. The first-to-invent system has served us well. If it is not broke, don’t fix it. I don’t really believe it is broke.”

Feinstein discussed the importance of the first-to-invent standard in the United States at length, as well as the importance of the associated “grace period” to independent inventors.

She said that the changes sought in the current legislation would make it much harder for inventors to prove that they were the first to come up with an idea.

“Another problem with the bill’s first to file system is the difficulty of proving that someone copied your invention,” she said.

“Currently, you as a first inventor can prove that you were first by presenting evidence that is in your control–your own records contemporaneously documenting the development of your invention,” she continued. “But to prove that somebody else’s patent application came from you under the bill, was “derived” from you, you would have to submit documents showing this copying. Only if there was a direct relationship between the two parties will the first inventor have such documents.

If there was only an indirect relationship, or an intermediary–for example, the first inventor described his invention at an angel investor presentation where he didn’t know the identities of many in attendance–the documents that would show “derivation”–copying–are not going to be in the first inventor’s possession; they would be in the second party’s possession. You would have to find out who they talked to, e-mailed with, et cetera to trace it back to your original disclosure. But the bill doesn’t provide for any discovery in these “derivation proceedings,” so the first inventor can’t prove their claim”

Feinstein also dismissed the arguments for a change in the system, noting that there are only 50 proceedings a year at the United States Patent and Trademark Office that dispute who created a new invention first.

That is a minuscule number considering that there are about 480,000 patent applications a year.

 

 

The proponents of so called “Patent Reform” have been pushing the misleading idea that the bill does not change the US to a “First-to-File” but to a “First-Inventor-to-File.”  There is no such thing as “first-inventor-to-file.” Only one person or group can be an inventor, the other people are just clever engineers.  For instance, if I recreated calculus without any apparent training in calculus, that would not make me the discover of calculus, it would just make me clever at math.

Proponents argue we do not have a “first-to-invent” system today but a first to invent who is diligent.  A number small inventors and start-up companies I know have had to put off patent and development efforts because of lack of funding.  These groups would not receive patents for their inventions when a bigger company outspent them and filed first. Under the “first-to-invent” rule these people are awarded the patent.

Finally, these situations where two people come up with similar or the same invention independently are extremely rare.  The only justification for changing our patent system to a “first-to-file” system is harmonization.  But the countries that have a “first-to-invent” system do not have a vibrant start-up market or independent inventor sector.  Since the SBA has shown that most emerging technologies are created by start-up companies and individual inventors, this change in our system will only hurt our economy.

 
Director Kappos Pushes “First to File”

Director of the Patent Office, David Kappos, provided the following explanation for why we should convert from a “first to invent” to a “first to file” system at the BIO International Convention.

“Kappos’ explanation of the long odds facing a small entity claiming to be the first to invent but who filed the patent application second.  Kappos likened the odds of such a Junior Party prevailing to the odds of being bitten by a Grizzly Bear and a Polar Bear on the same day.  He then went on to say that you have to go back to FY 2007 to find a prevailing small entity Junior Party in an interference.  As Kappos explained, those who think first to invent is a benefit for small entities are living a lie, which is certainly true, but many will not like to hear that truth.”

There are two problems with this “practical” answer: 1) the first person to file is not the inventor logically or morally, and 2) the unintended consequences of a first to file system.  A system that is supposedly practical but is not just will not succeed in spurring innovation.  The real answer is to reduce the burdens associated with interferences, not to trash the morally and logically correct answer – first to invent.

A first to file system will result in many poorly thought out patent applications increasing the PTO’s workload and increasing the number of Continuations-In-Part (CIPs).  The confusion created by this system of filing early and then following up with corrected applications will result in litigation being more expensive and less certain.  In addition, this system will further bias the patent system in favor of large entities.  Large entities will use a first to file system to flood the PTO with patents to overwhelm small entities and individual inventors in the race to the patent office.  Small entities and individual inventors will never be able to compete financially in this race to the PTO.  According to the SBA, most emerging technologies are created by small entities not large entities.  As a result, we need to make sure that our patent system is friendly for small entities if we want it to encourage innovation.

The result of the first to file system along with the publication system in the rest of the world has been to create a patent system for large entities.  The number of filings by small entities in these countries is trivial compared to the number of patent filings by small entities and individual inventor in the U.S.  There is no evidence that first to file system has spurred innovation in those countries that have this system.  So the “truth” here is that the first to file system is not designed to spur innovation – it is a further attempt to bias the patent system in favor of large corporations.

 
First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent

My good friend, Gene Quinn, of IPWatchdog, has am interesting post on the present patent reform bill.  http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/04/04/kappos-round-table-listening-continues-on-campus-of-uspto/id=10002/

His post brings up several interesting points.

Interferences & Independent Invention

If there were only 55 interferences last year, how come all the people calling for patent reform state that independent invention happens all the time?  If independent conception of inventions are so common you would expect a lot more interferences.  While I would grant you that the PTO is very reluctant to declare interferences, even taking this into account it shows very little independent invention.  So all the people calling for patent reform claiming that technological progress is inhibited because they are not allowed to practice their independent inventions appear to be disingenuous at best.  What is more likely is that they have not independently derived these inventions and they just do not pay a license fee to the true inventor.

First to File vs. First to Invent

The proposed solution for the first to file conversion is the scaled down one year grace period.  Your post clearly points out the limitations of this provision – namely it only protects the inventor against bar issues, but does not protect them from thieves that file a patent before the true inventor.  This does nothing to preserve our patent system for independent inventors or start-up companies.  No one with any resources and knowledge will rely on this scaled down one year grace period.  Within a decade of having passed this reform, people will argue that the one year grace period is meaningless and we should just move to a true first to file system.  Given the cost of filing a patent this will be the nail in the coffin of American Entrepreneurialism.  The patent system will just be for large entrenched companies who create incremental inventions.

Cost of Interferences

Your argument sounds logical.  Since most independent inventors cannot afford the cost of an interference, we will just get rid of them.  This correctly identifies the problem, but proposes an unjust solution.  A just solution is to reduce the cost, time, and formalism associated with interferences.  Logically, the inventor is the first one to conceive of the invention and reduce it to practice.  We need a system that is just and practical.  A practical system that is not just will lead to unintended consequences.  For instance, the publication requirement has led to our patent system giving away our technology to the rest of the world.  The practical answer was to publish our patent application and conform with the rest of the world.  The just and practical answer was to fund the PTO fully, eliminate needless formalities to patents and have patents issue in under one year.  The just and practical answer would have ensured that the US stayed the technological leader of the world and therefore economically vibrant.  Our present economy is the result of the sin of being practical but not just.

24 Month Provisional

While I am not inherently against this proposal, I can just hear the critics screaming “submarine patents.”  Extending the time to 24 months from 12 months that a provisional patent application allows the applicant to file a regular patent application sounds like a practical solution, however the better answer would be to streamline the process of applying for a patent.  We should work to reduce the time it takes to obtain a patent, reduce the cost it takes to obtain a patent, and reduce arbitrary rules required to obtain a patent that add no real value to the patent system.

Real Patent Reform

Nothing in the present patent reform proposal does anything to solve the real problems faced by inventors.  Instead of agreeing to a less bad patent reform bill, which should trash this bill and start over.  The number one issue that has to be in any patent reform bill is to stop fee diversion.  Fee diversion is fraud pure and simple.  If Congress had to live up to Sarbanes Oxley, they would all be in jail.  We need to repeal KSR.  Any objective system of patentability is better than a subjective standard for entrepreneurs and businesses.  (Only a judge or a trial lawyer thinks a subjective test is just).  For more on real patent reform see Real Patent Reform.

 
Foreigners Receive More Patents than U.S.!

For the first time in U.S. history more patents were issued to foreigners than U.S. residents, by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  According to the USPTO, foreigners received 80,271 patents while U.S. inventors received 77,501 in 2008.[1] Six of the top ten patenting companies in 2008 were foreign.

 

 This post is the Introduction to my book, which should be available on Amazon.com in December of 2009.

This book started as a project based on my observations.  I deal with technology start-up entrepreneurs everyday as a patent attorney.  I noticed a difference between the sort of projects my clients were undertaking since the technology downturn of 2000-2001 and the 90s.  Clients, in the 90s, would come into my office with plans to build businesses that were disruptive or revolutionary.  The technologies underlying these companies held the potential to completely redefine a market.  Some of these of these ideas would increase the available bandwidth by 10x for minimal costs or allow data searches that were 10-100x faster than existing technologies.  It was extremely exciting talking with these entrepreneurs.  Their energy was infectious and the potential implications of their work was mesmerizing.  The technology downturn of 2000-2001 forced a reevaluation of these aggressive business plans.  I expected that after a couple years of the technology market taking a breath, I would again be working with companies trying to change the world. 

 

Given a Voice on Patent Reform by AIPR,

Inventors Send a Clear Message

Researchers, Engineers and Patent Professionals Fear that

Weaker Patents Will Make America Less Competitive

New York, NY, June 4, 2009 – A non-profit organization, American Innovators for Patent Reform (AIPR), has been formed to give a voice to American innovators – inventors, scientists, engineers, researchers, small companies, investors, patent owners and intellectual property service providers – in the ongoing debate on patent reform.

 

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