This case is another example of the courts ignoring the statutory language and not understanding basic technical and patent concepts.  Cybersource invented a process for determining if credit card fraud was likely in an online transaction based on the relationship between the IP (Internet Protocol) information’s past association with the credit card.  They sued Retail Decisions for infringement of their patent 6,029,154 and Retail Decisions counter that the claims were unenforceable because they were not directed to statutory subject matter.

The court first examined claim 3, which had undergone a reissue examination.  Claim 3 is a method of first discovering the IP information normally used with the credit card and then determining if this indicative of a fraudulent transaction.

3.  A method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the Internet comprising the steps of:

a) obtaining information about other transactions that have utilized an Internet address that is identified with the [ ] credit card transaction;

b) constructing a map of credit card numbers based upon the other transactions and;

c) utilizing the map of credit card numbers to determine if the credit card transaction is valid.

The Court found this claim invalid under 35 USC 101, which states

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

Claim 3 is clearly directed to a process, but somehow the courts have decided to legislate from the bench and add additional requirements.  Here, the court argued that claim 3 did not meet either of the prongs of the machine or transformation test.  Which the court explained, “we held that a claimed process would only be “patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus; or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”  Step (a) requires obtaining information about other transactions on the internet associated with the credit card.  This is going to require a computer to access the internet and acquire this information and store it somewhere, probably on the computer.  In order for the computer to access the internet it needs a modem, which is an electronic circuit that generates voltage signals that are sent over the internet to another computer.  These are physical processes (transform voltages and currents) by machines.  A computer is a machine as is a modem.  This claim clearly meets both the machine and transformation prong of the test.

The court’s response that it would be possible for someone to just look at a previously compiled database of this information is inconsistent with the patent and reality.  The court ignores that a patent is presumed valid, which means that it MUST try to find an interpretation of the claim that is valid. Instead the court does the exact opposite.  A clear reading of the specification finds that a merchant will send credit card information to the internet verification system over the internet or at least over some communication system.  That means the method is tied to a machine, namely a computer and communication system comprising multiple computers.  It also means the computer is transformed.  The voltages stored in its memory change.  It makes no practical sense for this process to be undertaken by hand.  The merchant cannot have a customer wait for hours for a person to review a previously created written record (because if it is a database on a computer – it’s a MACHINE) to create the map of credit card numbers.  Then wait on the person to hand evaluate this information.  This process only makes sense when carried out by machines.  Retail Decisions is not arguing that they be allowed to carry the process out by hand to avoid the claims.  This line of reasoning is completely disingenuous.  This Courts’ reasoning makes a mockery of 35 USC § 282 and 35 USC § 101 and the machine or transformation test.

Claim 2 was a Beauregard claim—named after In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)—is a claim to a computer readable medium (e.g., a disk, hard drive, or other data storage device) containing program instructions for a computer to perform a particular process.  This case made it clear that you did not have to claim the computer to meet 35 USC § 101 requirements.  The Court just ignored this case and found claim 2 non-statutory for the same reasons as claim 3.  Whatever happened to stare decisis?  This is a clear case of Judicial Activism.

It is clear from the way the opinion was written that the judges felt the Cybersource patent was just too broad.  However, their reason for rejecting the claim was not on Novelty (102) or nonobviousness (103) it was lack of statutory subject matter.  The opinion seems to show a lack of understanding between the sections 101 and 102/103 of the code.

Non-Patent Attorneys on CAFC

This is another case that demonstrate that a requirement for being a judge on the CAFC should be that you were a practicing patent attorney, who actually prosecuted patent application.  In this case, none of the three judges are patent attorneys and Bryson and Dyk do not have a technical background.  The Court clearly did not understand how the invention worked.  They seem to believe that computer are not machines and perform mental processes.  They do not understand that computers are electrical circuits, the internet is made of computers, and all these computers are transforming voltages and currents, not unlike a transformer.  The judges showed confusion between different sections of the code and they ignored the previous ruling of their own Court.  Patent law is too important to be left to attorneys without the appropriate training.